All posts tagged AGI

Book review: Our Final Invention: Artificial Intelligence and the End of the Human Era by James Barrat.

This book describes the risks that artificial general intelligence will cause human extinction, presenting the ideas propounded by Eliezer Yudkowsky in a slightly more organized but less rigorous style than Eliezer has.

Barrat is insufficiently curious about why many people who claim to be AI experts disagree, so he’ll do little to change the minds of people who already have opinions on the subject.

He dismisses critics as unable or unwilling to think clearly about the arguments. My experience suggests that while it’s normally the case that there’s an argument that any one critic hasn’t paid much attention to, that’s often because they’ve rejected with some thought some other step in Eliezer’s reasoning and concluded that the step they’re ignoring wouldn’t influence their conclusions.

The weakest claim in the book is that an AGI might become superintelligent in hours. A large fraction of people who have worked on AGI (e.g. Eric Baum’s What is Thought?) dismiss this as too improbable to be worth much attention, and Barrat doesn’t offer them any reason to reconsider. The rapid takeoff scenarios influence how plausible it is that the first AGI will take over the world. Barrat seems only interested in talking to readers who can be convinced we’re almost certainly doomed if we don’t build the first AGI right. Why not also pay some attention to the more complex situation where an AGI takes years to become superhuman? Should people who think there’s a 1% chance of the first AGI conquering the world worry about that risk?

Some people don’t approve of trying to build an immutable utility function into an AGI, often pointing to changes in human goals without clearly analyzing whether those are subgoals that are being altered to achieve a stable supergoal/utility function. Barrat mentions one such person, but does little to analyze this disagreement.

Would an AGI that has been designed without careful attention to safety blindly follow a narrow interpretation of its programmed goal(s), or would it (after achieving superintelligence) figure out and follow the intentions of its authors? People seem to jump to whatever conclusion supports their attitude toward AGI risk without much analysis of why others disagree, and Barrat follows that pattern.

I can imagine either possibility. If the easiest way to encode a goal system in an AGI is something like “output chess moves which according to the rules of chess will result in checkmate” (turning the planet into computronium might help satisfy that goal).

An apparently harder approach would have the AGI consult a human arbiter to figure out whether it wins the chess game – “human arbiter” isn’t easy to encode in typical software. But AGI wouldn’t be typical software. It’s not obviously wrong to believe that software smart enough to take over the world would be smart enough to handle hard concepts like that. I’d like to see someone pin down people who think this is the obvious result and get them to explain how they imagine the AGI handling the goal before it reaches human-level intelligence.

He mentions some past events that might provide analogies for how AGI will interact with us, but I’m disappointed by how little thought he puts into this.

His examples of contact between technologically advanced beings and less advanced ones all refer to Europeans contacting Native Americans. I’d like to have seen a wider variety of analogies, e.g.:

  • Japan’s contact with the west after centuries of isolation
  • the interaction between neanderthals and humans
  • the contact that resulted in mitochondria becoming part of our cells

He quotes Vinge saying an AGI ‘would not be humankind’s “tool” – any more than humans are the tools of rabbits or robins or chimpanzees.’ I’d say that humans are sometimes the tools of human DNA, which raises more complex questions of how well the DNA’s interests are served.

The book contains many questionable digressions which seem to be designed to entertain.

He claims Google must have an AGI project in spite of denials by Google’s Peter Norvig (this was before it bought DeepMind). But the evidence he uses to back up this claim is that Google thinks something like AGI would be desirable. The obvious conclusion would be that Google did not then think it had the skill to usefully work on AGI, which would be a sensible position given the history of AGI.

He thinks there’s something paradoxical about Eliezer Yudkowsky wanting to keep some information about himself private while putting lots of personal information on the web. The specific examples Barrat gives strongly suggests that Eliezer doesn’t value the standard notion of privacy, but wants to limit peoples’ ability to distract him. Barrat also says Eliezer “gave up reading for fun several years ago”, which will surprise those who see him frequently mention works of fiction in his Author’s Notes.

All this makes me wonder who the book’s target audience is. It seems to be someone less sophisticated than a person who could write an AGI.